Endogenous majority rules with changing preferences

Mattias K. Polborn

This paper provides a new explanation why several US states have implemented supermajority requirements for tax increases. We model a dynamic and stochastic OLG economy where individual preferences depend on age and change over time in a systematic way. In this setting, we show that the first population of voters will choose a supermajority rule in order to influence the outcomes of future elections. We explore the robustness of the basic model and also find some empirical support for predictions derived from the model.

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Year of publication:	05 Dec. 2000 ; [Elektronische Ressource]
Other Persons:	Polborn, Mattias (contributor)
Institutions:	University of Western Ontario / Department of Economics (contributor)
Publisher:	London, Ontario : Univ. of Western Ontario, Dep. of Economics
Subject:	Supermajority \| taxation \| constitution \| overlapping generations \| political economy \| Abstimmungsregel \| Voting rule \| Steuerpolitik \| Tax policy \| Präferenztheorie \| Theory of preferences \| Politische Entscheidung \| Political decision

Extent:	Online-Ressource, 27 p., text ill
Series:	Research report / Department of Economics, Social Science Centre, The University of Western Ontario. - London, Ont. : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2256392-1. - Vol. 2000-12
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Gesamttitel von der Homepage Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat reader Systemvoraussetzungen: Postscript
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/70387 [Handle]
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001599126