Endogenous minimum participation in international environmental agreements : an experimental analysis
Year of publication: |
December 2015
|
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Authors: | McEvoy, David M. ; Cherry, Todd L. ; Stranlund, John Kevin |
Published in: |
Environmental & resource economics : the official journal of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0924-6460, ZDB-ID 1121258-5. - Vol. 62.2015, 4, p. 729-744
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Subject: | International environmental agreements | Minimum participation | Coalition formation | Public goods | Experiments | Voluntary agreements | Institution formation | Umweltabkommen | International environmental agreement | Koalition | Coalition | Öffentliche Güter | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Experiment | Trittbrettfahrerverhalten | Free rider problem | Selbstverpflichtung | Voluntary agreement | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Mitgliedschaft | Membership |
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