Endogenous Number of Lobby Groups in a Specific Factor Trade Model.

The basic goal of this paper is to develop an endogenous trade policy model in the Grossman and Helpman (1994) tradition that could engenise the number of lobby groups in the economy. It uses a game who has three stages.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Vaillant, M.
Subject:	SOCIAL CHOICE \| LOBBY GROUPS \| GAME THEORY

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	26 pages
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783326