Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: The Managerial Delegation Case

We introduce managerial delegation into Pal's (1998) model and examine the impact of the introduction of managerial delegation on endogenous timing in a mixed duopolistic model for differentiated goods. We show that a public firm and a private firm choose quantities sequentially in the equilibrium of our model. Thus, we find that the Pal''s (1998) results are robust against managerial delegation.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2007-10-19
Authors:	Nakamura, Yasuhiko ; Inoue, Tomohiro
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 12.2007, 27, p. 1-7
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Endogenous Timing

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior ; L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010836257