Endogenously choosing the timing of setting strategic contracts' levels and content in a managerial mixed duopoly with welfare-based and sales delegation contracts
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Nakamura, Yasuhiko |
Published in: |
International review of economics : journal of civil economy. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1865-1704, ZDB-ID 2390807-5. - Vol. 67.2020, 3, p. 363-402
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Subject: | Cournot competition | Bertrand competition | Endogenous timing of the levels of strategic contracts | Mixed duopoly | Welfare-based delegation | Sales delegation | Duopol | Duopoly | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Wohlfahrtsanalyse | Welfare analysis | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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