Endogenously choosing the timing of setting strategic contracts' levels and content in a managerial mixed duopoly with welfare-based and sales delegation contracts
Yasuhiko Nakamura
| Year of publication: |
2020
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Nakamura, Yasuhiko |
| Published in: |
International review of economics : journal of civil economy. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1865-1704, ZDB-ID 2390807-5. - Vol. 67.2020, 3, p. 363-402
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| Subject: | Cournot competition | Bertrand competition | Endogenous timing of the levels of strategic contracts | Mixed duopoly | Welfare-based delegation | Sales delegation | Duopol | Duopoly | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Kooperative Führung | Participative leadership | Vertrag | Contract | Öffentliches Unternehmen | Public enterprise | Preiswettbewerb | Price competition | Oligopol | Oligopoly | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Cournot-Wettbewerb |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1007/s12232-020-00347-9 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012320394