Energy Tax and Competition in Energy Efficiency: The Case of Consumer Durables

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of anenergy tax on technical improvements and on prices ofconsumer durables induced by strategic competition inenergy efficiency. If the gasoline tax is raised thisdoes in principle not affect the producers of carsbecause the motorist pays for it in terms of a highercost of using the car. This, however, affects the unitsales of car producers because of substitution towardsother modes of transportation. A second element ofreaction to energy price variation is an indirect oneand relates to the effect of energy prices ontechnology. Competition forces car producers todevelop more energy efficient cars in order to reducethe cost of using a car. This indirect effect canpartly offset the direct effect of higher energyprices on demand if it is profitable for theautomobile industry to engineer more energy efficientequipment. We will analyze the impact of an energy taxon energy efficiency and on the price of a durablegood. This will be done within the framework of aduopoly competing in prices and in the energyefficiency of its products. The government chooses awelfare maximizing energy tax as an incentive toinnovate. Then we will analyze a strategic two-stagedecision process in which the duopolists first decideabout energy efficiency and then compete in prices. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000