Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Asheim, Geir B. ; Brunnschweiler, Thomas |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 141.2023, p. 503-514
|
Subject: | Perfect information games | Backward induction paradox | Non-Archimedean probabilities | Stochastic independence | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Vollkommene Information | Complete information |
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