Epistemic robustness of sets closed under rational behavior

This paper provides two conditions of epistemic robustness, robustness to alternative best replies and robustness to non-best replies, and uses them to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Asheim, Geir ; Voorneveld, Mark ; Weibull, Jörgen W.
Publisher:	Stockholm : Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
Subject:	Rationales Verhalten \| Spieltheorie \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Robustes Verfahren \| Theorie \| epistemic game theory \| epistemic robustness \| rationalizability \| closedness under rational behavior \| mutual p-belief

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Series:	SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; 714
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	59761427X [GVK] hdl:10419/56104 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281186