Equal loss under separatorization and egalitarian values

Zhengxing Zou, Rene van den Brink

We characterize the equal division value, the equal surplus division value, and the class of their affine combinations for TU-games involving equal loss under separatorization. This axiom requires that, if a player becomes a dummifying player (Casajus and Huettner, in Economics Letters 122(2): 167-169, 2014), then any two other players are equally affected.

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Year of publication:	[2020]
Authors:	Zou, Zhengxing ; Brink, René van den
Publisher:	Amsterdam, The Netherlands : Tinbergen Institute
Subject:	Cooperative game \| equal division value \| equal surplus division value \| axiomatization \| Kooperatives Spiel \| Theorie \| Theory \| Transferierbarer Nutzen \| Transferable utility \| Shapley-Wert \| Shapley value \| Verteilungsgerechtigkeit \| Distributive justice

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 14 Seiten)
Series:	Discussion paper / Tinbergen Institute. - Rotterdam [u.a.] : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 0929-0834, ZDB-ID 2435783-2. - Vol. TI 2020, 043
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/229663 [Handle]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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