Equal Loss under Separatorization and Egalitarian Values

We characterize the equal division value, the equal surplus division value, and the class of their affine combinations for TU-games involving equal loss under separatorization. This axiom requires that, if a player becomes a dummifying player (Casajus and Huettner, in Economics Letters 122(2): 167-169, 2014), then any two other players are equally affected.

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Year of publication:	2020
Authors:	Zou, Zhengxing ; van den Brink, Rene
Publisher:	Amsterdam and Rotterdam : Tinbergen Institute
Subject:	Cooperative game \| equal division value \| equal surplus division value \| axiomatization

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Series:	Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; TI 2020-043/II
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	1725658607 [GVK] hdl:10419/229663 [Handle] RePEc:tin:wpaper:20200043 [RePEc]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012427143