Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information: The general symmetric case

Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium payoff.

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Year of publication:	1998-08-31
Authors:	Neyman, Abraham ; Sorin, Sylvain
Published in:	International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 27.1998, 2, p. 201-210
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Repeated games of incomplete information \| stochastic games

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received March 1996/Revised version January 1997/Final version May 1997
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005598520