Equilibrium Existence in Bipartite Social Games: A Generalization of Stable Matchings

We prove existence of equilibria in bipartite social games, where players choose both a strategy in a game and a partner with whom to play the game. Such social games generalize the well-known marriage problem where players choose partners but do not take actions subsequent to matching.

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Year of publication:	2008-03-02
Authors:	Jackson, Matthew ; Watts, Alison
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 3.2008, 12, p. 1-8
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Social Games

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; A1 - General Economics
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010629335