Equilibrium Refinement in Perturbed Games and in Sender- Receiver Games.
Year of publication: |
1992
|
---|---|
Authors: | Blume, A. |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, Tippie College of Business |
Subject: | game theory | economic models | economic equilibrium |
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