Equilibrium Refinements in Sender-Receiver Games.
| Year of publication: |
1992
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Blume, A. |
| Institutions: | Department of Economics, Tippie College of Business |
| Subject: | game theory | economic models | economic equilibriumLength: 25 pages |
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