Equilibrium selection in coordination games: Why do dominated strategies matter?

In this paper I illustrate by an example that strictly dominated strategies may affect the process of the equilibrium selection in coordination games. The strategy profile that gets selected may be both Pareto and risk dominated. This distinguishes it from the examples provided in Ellison (2000) and Maruta (1997).

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Basov, Suren
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 3.2004, 41, p. 1-3
Publisher:	AccessEcon

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005416961