Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information
Jon X. Eguia, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Rebecca Morton, Antonio Nicolò
| Year of publication: |
2018
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Eguia, Jon X. ; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol ; Morton, Rebecca B. ; Nicolò, Antonio |
| Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 109.2018, p. 465-483
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| Subject: | Equilibrium selection | Imperfect information | Multiple equilibria | Passive beliefs | Symmetric beliefs | Vertical contracting | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory | Rationale Erwartung | Rational expectations | Erwartungsbildung | Expectation formation | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Gleichgewichtsmodell | Equilibrium model |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.008 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012173235