Equity contracts and incentive design in start-up teams
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Kagan, Evgeny ; Leider, Stephen ; Lovejoy, William S. |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 66.2019, 10, p. 4879-4898
|
Subject: | entrepreneurial operations | contracting | start-ups | behavioral operations | innovation | Unternehmensgründung | Business start-up | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Entrepreneurship | Entrepreneurship approach | Vertrag | Contract | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Innovation |
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