Equity, envy and efficiency under asymmetric information

Varian's (Varian, H., 1974. Equity, Envy and Efficiency. Journal of Economic Theory 9, 63-91) main results are not valid anymore if the agents are asymmetrically informed at the time of contracting: 1) envy-freeness and efficiency may be incompatible; 2) there may exist efficient allocation rules such that every agent envies another. Two weaker positive properties are formulated.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	de Clippel, Geoffroy
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 99.2008, 2, p. 265-267
Publisher:	Elsevier

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005362419