An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions

This paper investigates the relationship between secure implementability (Saijo et al. in Theor Econ 2:203–229, <CitationRef CitationID="CR17">2007</CitationRef>) and full implementability in truthful strategies (Nicolò in Rev Econ Des 8:373–382, <CitationRef CitationID="CR13">2004</CitationRef>). Although secure implementability is in general stronger than full implementability in truthful strategies, this paper shows that both properties are equivalent under the social choice function that satisfies non-wastefulness (Li and Xue in Econ Theory, doi:<ExternalRef> <RefSource>10.1007/s00199-012-0724-0</RefSource> <RefTarget Address="10.1007/s00199-012-0724-0" TargetType="DOI"/> </ExternalRef>) in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014