Escaping Arrow's theorem : the advantage-standard model
Year of publication: |
2025
|
---|---|
Authors: | Holliday, Wesley H. ; Kelley, Mikayla |
Subject: | Arrow's impossibility theory | Incompleteness | Independence of irrelevant alternatives | Social choice theory | Voting theory | Theorie | Theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Unmöglichkeitstheorem | Impossibility theorem | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule |
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