Essential stability in games with endogenous sharing rules

We prove that essential games with endogenous sharing rules form a dense residual set and that every game with endogenous sharing rules has at least one minimal essential set of solutions. Furthermore, we establish that essential continuous games form a dense residual set and that every continuous game has at least one minimal essential set of Nash equilibria.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Zhou, Yong-Hui ; Yu, Jian ; Xiang, Shu-Wen ; Wang, Long
Published in:	Journal of Mathematical Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068. - Vol. 45.2009, 3-4, p. 233-240
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Nash equilibrium Game with endogenous sharing rules Essential stability Upper hemicontinuous Residual set

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005374229