Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable

We extend the result from Bossert and Sprumont (2013) that every single-valued choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable via strict preferences to the case of choice correspondences via weak preferences.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Rehbeck, John
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 88.2014, C, p. 207-210
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Revealed preference \| Backwards-induction \| Rationalizability

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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