Every Choice Function is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable

A choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable if there exists a finite perfect-information extensive-form game such that, for each subset of alternatives, the backwards-induction outcome of the restriction of the game to that subset of alternatives coincides with the choice from that subset. We prove that every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Bossert, Walter ; Sprumont, Yves
Institutions:	Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie Quantitative (CIREQ)

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cahiers de recherche.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	19 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883529