Evolution and Learning in Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs

We consider four models of evolution and learning in games which rely on perturbations of payoffs, including stochastic fictitious play. In all cases, we establish global stability results for zerosum games, games with an interior ESS, potential games, and supermodular games.

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Year of publication:	2001-03
Authors:	Hofbauer, Josef ; Sandholm, William H.
Institutions:	University of Vienna, Department of Economics

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Vienna Economics Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C79 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. Other
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005623027