Evolution in Finitely Repeated Coordination Games

I apply a version of Kandori et al. (1993, Econometrica, 61, 29–56) and Young's (1993, Econometrica, 61, 57–84) evolutionary dynamic to finitely repeated coordination games. The dynamic is modified by allowing mutations to affect only off path beliefs. I find that repetition within a match leads agents to sacrifice current payoffs in order to increase payoffs in later stages. As a consequence, evolution leads to (almost) efficiency

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Robles, Jack
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games \| Evolutionsökonomik \| Evolutionary economics \| Dynamisches Spiel \| Dynamic game \| Pareto-Optimum \| Pareto efficiency
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Games and Economic Behaviour, Vol. 34, pp. 312-330, 2001 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 2001 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	C79 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. Other
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014198628