EVOLUTION IN SYMMETRIC INCOMPLETEINFORMATION GAMES

The paper compares two models of evolution in symmetric twoplayergames with incomplete information. One model postulates thatthe type of a player is fixed, and evolution works within types. Inthe other model type-contingent strategies evolve. In the case of twotypes and two strategies it is shown that the stability properties ofstationary states are the same under the two dynamics when payoffsdo not depend on the type of the other player, but may differ whenthey do.

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Year of publication:	2004-05-01
Authors:	Amann, Erwin ; Possajennikov, Alex
Institutions:	Universität <Duisburg ; University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics
Published in:	The University of Nottingham / School of Economics - discussion papers Discussion PaperNo. 04/08
Subject:	Stabilität \| Evolution \| development \| Spieltheorie \| game theory \| Auszahlung <Spieltheorie> \| payoff \| Spieler \| heterogeneous player

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Extent:	274432 bytes 20 p. application/pdf
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
ISSN:	1360-2438
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; Sociological and psychological aspects ; Market research ; Individual Reports, Studies ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868794