Evolutionary and asymptotic stability in symmetric multi-player games

We provide a classification of symmetric three-player games with two strategies and investigate evolutionary and asymptotic stability (in the replicator dynamics) of their Nash equilibria. We discuss similarities and differences between two-player and multi-player games. In particular, we construct examples which exhibit a novel behavior not found in two-player games. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Bukowski, Maciej ; Miekisz, Jacek
Published in:	International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 33.2004, 1, p. 41-54
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	multi-player games \| evolutionarily stable strategies \| asymptotic stability \| replicator dynamics \| risk-dominance

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755644