Evolutionary Dynamics and a Refinement of the Neutral Stability Criterion

We introduce two refinements of the neutral stability criterion, namely the ascending and the eroding neutrally stable strategies (NSS). These criteria take into account how well the NSS preform against all pure strategies in symmetric two-player games. We also present a dynamic model which supports the refinements.

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Torstensson, Pär
Publisher:	Lund : Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
Subject:	Evolutionary dynamics \| Neutrally stable strategies \| ascending NSS \| Eroding NSS.

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Series:	Working Paper ; 2005:37
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	493098070 [GVK] hdl:10419/259920 [Handle] RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2005_037 [RePEc]
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208491