Evolutionary Dynamics and Long-Run Selection

We study the emergence and nature of long-run behavior of continuous state space dynamics that are subjected to random shocks. It is shown that the fine details of the underlying deterministic dynamics may be crucial in determining the evolution of the system. In particular, a risk dominated strategy can emerge in an evolutionary game subject to symmetric decaying perturbations.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Feinberg, Yossi
Published in:	Advances in Theoretical Economics. - Berkeley Electronic Press. - Vol. 6.2006, 1, p. 1239-1239
Publisher:	Berkeley Electronic Press

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	oai:bepress:bejte-1239
Classification:	C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086850