Evolutionary Dynamics and Long-Run Selection

We study the emergence and nature of long-run behavior of continuous state space dynamics that are subjected to random shocks. It is shown that the fine details of the underlying deterministic dynamics may be crucial in determining the evolution of the system. In particular, a risk dominated strategy can emerge in an evolutionary game subject to symmetric decaying perturbations.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Feinberg, Yossi
Published in:	Advances in Theoretical Economics. - De Gruyter, ISSN 1534-5963, ZDB-ID 2040051-2. - Vol. 6.2006, 1
Publisher:	De Gruyter

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

subito order

I need help

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	research-article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.2202/1534-5963.1239 [DOI]
Source:	Other ZBW resources

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014588998