With China’s rapid industrialization and urbanization, the building industry generates a large number of construction waste. At present, the treatment of construction waste in most parts of our country mainly consists of open storage and landfill, which aggravate the deterioration of the environment. Thus, the building industry has become a national target for reducing environmental impacts, and how to effectively and rationally treat construction waste has become an urgent problem. There is a general agreement among researchers that construction waste recycling is not only an important means of improving the efficiency of resource utilization but also an effective way of curbing the deterioration of the environment in China. The prior study has focused on the method of waste treatment and the recycling behavior of a single stakeholder, and is lacking on consideration of the cooperation among the stakeholders. In practice, there is no effective cooperation among these stakeholders, which leads to the overall level of construction waste recycling is low. So, this study is based on the construction enterprises, recycling enterprises and government which are the major stakeholders in construction waste recycling, and analyzes the impact of individual selection on group behaviors. This study develops a dynamic evolutionary game model on construction waste recycling to analyze the symbiotic evolution between the construction enterprises and recycling enterprises’ behavior, and derives the stable strategies in situation with or without government incentive, as well as investigates how the government’s incentive policy affects the dynamic evolution process of construction waste recycling. The results show that without government incentive the formation of cooperation between the construction enterprise and recycling enterprise depends on whether they can both benefit from recycling, including the growth rate of earnings, extra cost of recycling, initial profit without carrying out recycling and the cost of landfill. The two parties may tend to non-cooperation in all cases, which is in line with the current situation of recycling industry in China. Meanwhile, construction enterprise and recycling enterprise will gradually cooperate on construction waste recycling under government subsidies. When the two parties can both benefit from recycling, subsidizing construction enterprise can make cooperation strategy become the evolutionary stable strategy, that is, recycling enterprise will be inclined to cooperation spontaneously without any subsidy from the government. Construction enterprise’s strategy will affect the behavior of recycling enterprise under this circumstances. On the contrary, if neither of the two parties is profitable, government can promote cooperation by subsidizing both two parties. In addition, there is no difference in the amount of subsidy to construction enterprise no matter the two parties are profitable or not, which only affects the government’s subsidy choice to recycling enterprise. This study could help provide some scientific recommendations for government to promote construction waste recycling and establishing benchmark for future improvement
