Evolutionary Rent-Seeking

Tullock's analysis of rent-seeking is reconsidered from an evolutionary point of view. We show that evolutionarily stable behavior in a rent-seeking contest differs from efficient rent-seeking behavior in a Nash equilibrium. We explore that implications of evolutionary stability for rent-seeking behavior and relate them to the well examined Nash equilibrium behavior. A most interesting result is an overdissipation law, which holds in evolutionary equilibrium.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Hehenkamp, Burkhard ; Leininger, Wolfgang ; Possajennikov, Alex
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

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Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; 620
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	845301160 [GVK] hdl:10419/76079 [Handle] RePec:ces:ceswps:_620 [RePEc]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315439