Evolutionary stability in repeated extensive games played by finite automata

We discuss the emergence of cooperation in repeated Trust Mini-Games played by finite automata. Contrary to a previous result obtained by Piccione and Rubinstein (1993), we first prove that this repeated game admits two Nash equilibria, a cooperative and a non-cooperative one. Second, we show that the cooperative equilibrium is the only (cyclically) stable set under the so-called best response dynamics.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Andreozzi, Luciano
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 79.2013, C, p. 67-74
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Finite automata \| Trust game \| Evolutionary stability \| Cooperation

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010662456