Ex post implementation in environments with private goods

We prove by construction that ex post incentive compatible mechanisms exist in a private goods setting with multi-dimensional signals and interdependent values. The mechanism shares features with the generalized Vickrey auction of one-dimensional signal models. The construction implies that for environments with private goods, informational externalities (i.e., interdependent values) are compatible with ex post equilibrium in the presence of multi-dimensional signals.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2006-09-07
Authors:	Bikhchandani, Sushil
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 1.2006, 3, p. 369-393
Publisher:	Econometric Society
Subject:	Ex post incentive compatibility \| multi-dimensional information \| interdependent values

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005515724