Ex post implementation in environments with private goods

Sushil Bikhchandani

We prove by construction that ex post incentive compatible mechanisms exist in a private goods setting with multi-dimensional signals and interdependent values. The mechanism shares features with the generalized Vickrey auction of one-dimensional signal models. The construction implies that for environments with private goods, informational externalities (i.e., interdependent values) are compatible with ex post equilibrium in the presence of multi-dimensional signals.

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Year of publication:	September 2006
Authors:	Bikhchandani, Sushil
Published in:	Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 1.2006, 3, p. 369-393
Subject:	Ex post incentive compatibility \| multi-dimensional information \| interdependent values \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Anreiz \| Incentives

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/150084 [Handle]
Classification:	D44 - Auctions
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011702816