Ex post information rents in sequential screening
Year of publication: |
2015
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Authors: | Krähmer, Daniel ; Strausz, Roland |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 90.2015, p. 257-273
|
Subject: | Information rents | Sequential screening | Information disclosure | Theorie | Theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Signalling | Informationswert | Information value | Monopol | Monopoly | Ökonomische Rente | Economic rent | Informationsverhalten | Information behaviour | Preisdifferenzierung | Price discrimination |
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