Excess control, agency costs and the probability of going private in France
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Belkhir, Mohamed ; Boubaker, Sabri ; Rouatbi, Wael |
Published in: |
Global finance journal. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Inc., ISSN 1044-0283, ZDB-ID 1117243-5. - Vol. 24.2013, 3, p. 250-265
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Subject: | Going private | Ownership structure | Large shareholders | Corporate governance | Eigentümerstruktur | Corporate Governance | Frankreich | France | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Börsenrückzug | Delisting | Privatisierung | Privatization | Aktionäre | Shareholders |
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