Exchange and Optimality

A feasible social state is irreducible if and only if, for any non-trivial partition of individuals into two groups, there exists another feasible social state at which every individual in the first group is equally well-off and someone strictly better-off. Competitive equilibria decentralize irreducible Pareto optimal social states

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Ghosal, Sayantan ; Polemarchakis, Heraklis M.
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Wohlfahrtsökonomik \| Welfare economics \| Gleichgewichtstheorie \| Equilibrium theory
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economic Theory, Vol. 13, Iss. 3, April 1999 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D60 - Welfare Economics. General ; D62 - Externalities
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014194822