Executive compensation : a general equilibrium perspective
Year of publication: |
April 2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Danthine, Jean-Pierre ; Donaldson, John B. |
Published in: |
Review of economic dynamics. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 1094-2025, ZDB-ID 1406100-4. - Vol. 18.2015, 2, p. 269-286
|
Subject: | Incentives | Optimal contracting | Stochastic discount factor | Pay-for-luck | Relative performance | Theorie | Theory | Allgemeines Gleichgewicht | General equilibrium | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Diskontierung | Discounting | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Aktienoption | Stock option | Anreiz |
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