Executive Compensation and Incentive Pay Sensitivity Prior to CEO Turnover : Evidence from US Firms
Year of publication: |
[2023]
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chulkov, Dmitriy ; Barron, John |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | USA | United States | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Arbeitsmobilität | Labour mobility | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Führungswechsel | Executive turnover | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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