Executive stock options and systemic risk
| Year of publication: |
2022
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Armstrong, Christopher ; Nicoletti, Allison ; Zhou, Frank S. |
| Published in: |
Journal of financial economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-405X, ZDB-ID 187118-3. - Vol. 146.2022, 1, p. 256-276
|
| Subject: | Business cycles | Equity incentives | Executive compensation | Systemic risk | Aktienoption | Stock option | Systemrisiko | Managervergütung | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Konjunktur | Business cycle | Finanzkrise | Financial crisis | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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