Existence and computation of pure-strategy equilibria in models of legislative bargaining with reconsideration
Year of publication: |
2008
|
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Authors: | Diermeier, Daniel ; Fong, Pohan |
Publisher: |
Evanston, IL : Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |
Subject: | Legislative bargaining | reconsideration | evolving default | proposal power | lack of commitment | distributive politics | public goods | spatial model |
Series: | Discussion Paper ; 1466 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 58766651X [GVK] hdl:10419/31248 [Handle] RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1466 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation |
Source: |
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