Existence of free entry equilibrium in aggregative games with asymmetric agents

In this paper, we examine a free entry aggregative game where agents can be asymmetric. We show the existence of a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of this game. The proof is a constructive one and therefore we provide a method to derive a subgame perfect equilibrium within a reasonable time.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Okumura, Yasunori
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 127.2015, C, p. 14-16
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Entry \| Aggregative games \| Cournot \| Constructive proof

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189517