Existence of sparsely supported correlated equilibria

We show that every finite N-player normal form game possesses a correlated equilibrium with a precise lower bound on the number of outcomes to which it assigns zero probability. In particular, the largest games with a unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games; moreover, the lower bound grows exponentially in the number of players N.

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Year of publication:	2005-10
Authors:	Germano, Fabrizio ; Lugosi, Gábor
Institutions:	Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Subject:	Correlated equilibrium \| finite games

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772039