Exit and voice: yardstick versus fiscal competition across governments

Politicians are disciplined through the electoral system. But this is often not enough to eliminate political rents. Economists suggest that competition across governments may also help. But intergovernmental competition can take two forms, through tax competition (exit) or yardstick competition (voice). We show these two forms may not, and in general do not, work in the same direction. Tax competition may reduce the screening properties of yardstick competition.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Bordignon, Massimo
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Subject:	Leviathan-Modell \| Steuerwettbewerb \| Yardstick Competition \| Abwanderung und Widerspruch \| Spieltheorie \| Zwei-Länder-Modell \| Theorie

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Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; 2069
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	555835987 [GVK] hdl:10419/26114 [Handle]
Classification:	H7 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264185