Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability.

In this paper we model the dynamic interaction of two types of agents, experimenters and imitators, whose behavior is characterized by simple rules of thumb. The agents repeatedly play a one-shot game in which the agent's actions are strategic substitutes.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Gale, D. ; Rosental, R.W.
Institutions:	Industry Studies Program (ISP), Department of Economics
Subject:	ECONOMIC MODELS \| ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM \| GAME THEORY

More details

Series:	Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	32 pages
Classification:	D50 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium. General ; H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; C79 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. Other
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005640949