Exploration and incentives in reinforcement learning
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Simchowitz, Max ; Slivkins, Aleksandrs |
Published in: |
Operations research. - Linthicum, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5463, ZDB-ID 2019440-7. - Vol. 72.2024, 3, p. 983-998
|
Subject: | reinforcement learning | information asymmetry | information design | Market Analytics and Revenue Management | mechanism design | exploration-exploitation tradeoff | Bayesian incentive-compatibility | incentivized exploration | Markov decision processes | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Revenue-Management | Revenue management | Lernprozess | Learning process | Markov-Kette | Markov chain | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Lernen | Learning | Anreiz | Incentives | Entscheidung | Decision | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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