Exploration versus exploitation in technology firms : the role of compensation structure for R&D workforce
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Cui, Victor ; Ding, Waverly ; Yanadori, Yoshio |
Published in: |
Research policy : policy, management and economic studies of science, technology and innovation. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0048-7333, ZDB-ID 121149-3. - Vol. 48.2019, 6, p. 1534-1549
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Subject: | Compensation | Exploration and exploitation | Innovation | Motivation | Pay dispersion | R&D employee | Tournament incentive | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory | Innovationsmanagement | Innovation management | Arbeitskräfte | Workforce | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Hochtechnologie | High technology | Managervergütung | Executive compensation |
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