Extended shareholder liability as a means to constrain moral hazard in insured banks
Alexander W. Salter, Vipin Veetil, Lawrence H. White
| Year of publication: |
February 2017
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| Authors: | Salter, Alexander William ; Veetil, Vipin ; White, Lawrence H. |
| Published in: |
The quarterly review of economics and finance : journal of the Midwest Economics Association ; journal of the Midwest Finance Association. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1062-9769, ZDB-ID 1114217-0. - Vol. 63.2017, p. 153-160
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| Subject: | Bagehot hypothesis | Deposit insurance | Double liability | Moral hazard | Triple liability | Unlimited liability | Moral Hazard | Haftung | Liability | Einlagensicherung | Theorie | Theory | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Haftpflichtversicherung | Liability insurance | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Beschränkte Haftung | Limited liability | Bilanzstrukturmanagement | Asset-liability management | Bankrisiko | Bank risk |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.qref.2016.04.006 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011791999