Extending Market Power through Vertical Integration.

This paper derives a model of vertical integration when it is difficult to write binding long-term supply price contracts. Thus, a vertical separated monopolist is vulnerable to hold-up. Without integration, the authors demonstrate that a bottleneck monopolist has an incentive to encourage more firms in a related segment than would arise in a pure monopoly.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	de Fontenay, C. ; Gans, J.S.
Institutions:	School of Economics, UNSW Business School
Subject:	MONOPOLIES \| MARKET STRUCTURE \| VERTICAL INTEGRATION

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Series:	New South Wales - School of Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	31 pages
Classification:	L42 - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005631351